

Hacking mobile network via SS7: interception, shadowing and more

Dmitry Kurbatov Vladimir Kropotov


Positive Research

Agenda

- Intro
- Attacks prerequisites, costs and case studies
- Official and underground market brief
- Possible Security measures
- Forecasts


In Service LTE Networks

In Service LTE Networks



VoLTE Networks

VoLTE Networks




http://ltemaps.org/

The most of the world performs HANGDOVER


LTE only for web browsing

To perform a call subscriber is downgraded to 3G (handover)

Interconnect / roaming




Kind of IPv4 vs IPv6 dilemma



SS7 is still most used interconnect/roaming network

Mobility
Call control
Billing
Crypto



2014 - year of SS7 security issues







Hackito Ergo Sum 2014

Locating mobile phones

Positive Hack Days IV

 How to Intercept a Conversation Held on the Other Side of the Planet

Washington Post

Secretly track cellphones

31C3

- SS7: Locate. Track. Manipulate
- Mobile self-defense

SS7 for (bad) guys

Tracking

Locating mobile phones and secretly tracking

Denial of Service

Disrupt subscriber connectivity and service availability

Interception

Listen to calls, intercept short messages

Threats to Operator

Threats to IoT

Basic Terms

IMSI ~ SIM Card

• IMEI ~ Device


MSISDN ~ Your Number

HLR ~ Subscriber DB

MSC ~ Call Processing


Tracking / 跟踪(位置)

Common Step 0 for Any Attack



- Attacker sends request SendRoutingInfoForSM addressing MAP message by MSISDN
- 2. HLR replies with:
 - own address
 - serving MSC address
 - IMSI

Get Cell ID



- Attacker sends request provideSubscriberInfo addressing MAP message by IMSI and asking for subscriber location
- 2. MSC replies with Cell ID:
 - MCC 250
 - MNC 90
 - LAC 4A67
 - CID 673D



Get Location...

Search in Internet for physical location by MCC, MNC, LAC, CID

MCC: 250

MNC: 90


LAC: 4A67

CID: 673D






...and Track User Just Like SkyLock



http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1275167/skylock-product-description-2013.pdf

Underground market demands



Отследить абонента по oko, 28.05.2010, в раздел: Э

Tracking subscriber using the phone number
Yep, Even in 2010

Tracking



Nobody wants to be constantly monitored.

Tracking is a violation of "Personal data protection" laws.

Very hard to stop:

- AnyTimeInterrogation
- ProvideSubscriberInfo
- ProvideSubscriberLocation

DoS/阻斷服務攻擊


To make someone unavailable

To stop data leakage

What else?




Common Step 0 for Any Attack



- Attacker sends request SendRoutingInfoForSM addressing MAP message by MSISDN
- 2. HLR replies with:
 - own address
 - serving MSC address
 - IMSI


Denial of Service. Step 1



- Attacker registers Bob on the fake MSC
- 2. HLR sets up new location for Bob
- 3. HLR asks real MSC to release a memory



Denial of Service. Step 2



- 1. Alex calls Bob
- 2. MSC is looking for Bob and asks HLR to provide information
- 3. HLR asks fake MSC to provide Roaming Number

demo

Interception / 截聽

How to Intercept SMS (截聽短信)

- A virus on a smartphone and what if a certain subscriber is a target? How to infect him particularly?
- Reissue SIM? It works only once.
- Radio signal interception (GSM A5/1)? You need to be nearby.
- Via SS7 network





Fake Mobile Phone Towers Operating In The UK

A Sky News investigation uncovers the use of IMSI catchers, which can collect the data of innocent people as they use their phone.



Video: Secret Towers Tracing Your Calls









By Tom Cheshire, Technology Correspondent

Sky News has found evidence that rogue mobile phone towers, which can listen in on people's calls without their knowledge, are being operated in the UK.



ComputerWeekly.com

IT Management Industry Sectors Technology Topics

Ross Coulthart

60 Minutes Australia

16 Aug 2015 23:58

An investigation by Australian TV show 60 Minutes demonstrates how hackers based thousands of miles away in Germany were able to record the calls of an Australian senator and track his movements


A Cheap Way For Tapping

10\$ + OpenSource




+ RosmocomBB +






Common Step 0 for Any Attack



- Attacker sends request SendRoutingInfoForSM addressing MAP message by MSISDN
- 2. HLR replies with:
 - own address
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
SMS Interception. Step 1



- Attacker registers Bob on the fake MSC
- 2. HLR sets up new location for Bob
- 3. HLR asks real MSC to release a memory




SMS Interception. Step 2



- 1. Alex sends SMS to Bob
- 2. MSC translates the SMS to SMS-C
- 3. SMS-C requests HLR for Bob's location
- HLR replies with a fake MSC address
- 5. SMS-C translates SMS to the fake MSC

Bob


demo



SMS Interception, We "Really Missed" You


- Access to payment service
- Recover passwords for email and social networks
- Online banking OTP





Illegal cases


SMS Interception



POSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES

Active actions and Impersonation

- —Mobile balance transfer over USSD
- —Premium Rate SMS Subscriptions
- —Credit cards money transfers via phone
- —Even fake calls from Victim number



How to Get Into SS7


How They Can Get Into SS7



Legal with license Semi legal without




Find a guy




Hack border device


Find a Guy




Find a Guy




Find a Guy




Hack border device



Today: IP Connectivity



Misconfiguration Example



Critical

Research Updates

- SS7 security threats
- Mobile Internet vulnerabilities (GPRS)
- SIM vulnerabilities

http://www.ptsecurity.com/library/whitepapers/

http://blog.ptsecurity.com/



Questions?

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