

Features of such cases



an acceptable outcome



desire to realize it



positioned to make it happen



Consequentialism is basically indifferent to whether a state of affairs consists in what I do, or is produced by what I do, where that notion is itself wide enough to include, for instance, situations in which other people do things which I have made them do, or allowed them to do, or encouraged them to do, or given them a chance to do. All that consequentialism is interested in is the idea of these doings being *consequences* of what I do, and that is a relation broad enough to include the relations just mentioned, and many others...



Correspondingly, there is no relevant difference which consists *just* in a state of affairs being brought about by me, without intervention of other agents, and another being brought about through the intervention of other agents... Granted that the states of affairs have been adequately described in causally and evaluatively relevant terms, it makes no further comprehensible difference who produces them... (Williams, 1973, pp. 93–95)